ODP Security Track Overview

The Security track is designed for individuals who are interested in enhancing the security posture of the Open Device Partnership (ODP) framework. This track focuses on the design, implementation, and testing of security solutions that protect ODP components and applications from threats and vulnerabilities. Readers will learn how ODP creates robust security measures that ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability across ODP implementations. The track covers various aspects of security, including threat modeling, risk assessment, secure coding practices, and incident response strategies.

Security

Reduce firmware attack surface significantly, and meet modern security expectations using proven tools and patterns.

Security and Trustworthiness from the Ground Up

“If the foundation is weak, nothing built on top can be trusted.”

Rust is a modern, memory-safe language that mitigates entire classes of vulnerabilities endemic to C memory management, buffer overflows, use-after-free, and so forth by detecting and addressing these issues at compile time -- so there are few, if any, unpleasant surprises at runtime.

ODP is foundationally centered around Rust and not only embraces these philosophies, it defines patterns that further enhance the memory-safe paradigm, by preventing unauthorized access between ownership domains and guarding against possible malicious intrusions while implementing proven industry-standard patterns.

flowchart LR
  Start[Power On] --> ROM
  ROM --> FirmwareCheck[Validate Firmware Signature]
  FirmwareCheck --> DXECore[Load DXE Core]
  DXECore --> OSLoader[Invoke Bootloader]
  OSLoader --> OSVerify[Validate OS Signature]
  OSVerify --> OSBoot[Launch OS]
  OSBoot --> Ready[Platform Ready]

Adoption of standards and patterns of DICE and EL2 Hypervisor supported architectures -- from a Rust-driven baseline - enables a hardware-rooted chain of trust across boot phases, aligning with NIST and platform security goals and requirements.

ODP makes component modularity and portability with a transparent provenance a practical and safe proposition by making it feasiable to audit and verify firmware behavior in specifically constrained ways.

ODP Security Architecture

Whether in the Patina or Embedded Controller domain, ODP's security architecture is designed to ensure the integrity and trustworthiness of firmware components. This architecture is built upon several key principles:

• Least Privilege: Components operate with the minimum privileges necessary to perform their functions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access or damage.
• Isolation: Components are isolated from one another to prevent unintended interactions and to contain potential security breaches.
• Verification: Components are verified at boot time to ensure they have not been tampered with and that they meet the expected security standards.
• Layered Defense: Security concerns are enforced at multiple levels — bootloader, firmware, EC messaging, and runtime service dispatch.

flowchart TD
    A[Reset Vector / ROM]
    B[Bootloader / Core Root of Trust]
    C[Patina DXE Core]
    D[OS Boot]
    E[EC Runtime]
    F[EC Services]

    A --> B
    B --> C
    C --> D

    B -->|Key Exchange, FFA| E
    E --> F

    subgraph Secure World
        B
        E
    end

    subgraph Non-Secure World
        C
        D
        F
    end

Figure: System Trust Boundaries

The ODP system defines strong isolation between secure and non-secure execution. Firmware integrity is established early and extended to runtime services. EC services may operate in either domain, depending on platform architecture.

Secure Boot Architecture

Secure Boot is a cryptographically enforced boot validation mechanism that ensures each stage of system initialization is authenticated and unmodified. Its goal is to prevent unauthorized firmware or operating systems from executing on the platform.

flowchart TD
    A[__Boot ROM__ <br>Immutable Trust Anchor] 
    B[__Bootloader__ <br> - _e.g. BL1, Coreboot_]
    C[__Patina DXE Core__ <br>Signed EFI Binary]
    D[__OS Bootloader__<br>_Optional Verification_]
    E[__Operating System__<br>Signed Kernel and Drivers]

    A --> B
    B --> C
    C --> D
    D --> E

Figure: Secure Boot Chain of Trust

Each stage validates the integrity and authenticity of the next using cryptographic signatures or measured hashes. Patina fits into this chain as the DXE-phase firmware payload, typically signed and validated prior to execution.

Role of Patina in Secure Boot

1. The DXE Core produced by Patina is signed and stored as an .efi binary.
2. The platform bootloader (coreboot, U-Boot, etc.) or UEFI Secure Boot loader validates the Patina payload before execution.
3. Patina itself does not contain its own secure bootloader but is designed to be a signed leaf node in a secure boot chain.

On platforms with measured boot (e.g., DRTM or TPM-backed environments), Patina binaries can also be hashed and extended into a PCR register.

Signature and Validation Workflow

flowchart TD
    A[__Patina EFI Binary__]
    B[__Public Key__ - _in Bootloader_]
    C[__Signature Verification__]
    D[__Execution__]

    A --> C
    B --> C
    C -->|If Valid| D
    C -->|If Invalid| E[Halt / Recovery]

A secure boot process is only one part of the platform's trust chain. To preserve integrity after boot, Firmware Updates must be signed and verified, and Runtime E access must be validated and isolated.

Secure Firmware Updates

Secure firmware update mechanisms are critical to preserving system trust over time. They prevent unauthorized or malicious firmware from being flashed, and protect the system from rollback to known-vulnerable versions. ODP-based firmware components, including Patina and the EC runtime, support signed and validated update flows.

Update Integrity Requirements

Firmware updates must meet several key integrity requirements:

• Authentication: Updates must be signed by a trusted vendor key.
• Integrity: Payloads must not be tampered with (crytopgraphic hashes are checked).
• Rollback Protection: Systems must prevent downgrading to older, potentially vulnerable firmware versions.
• Isolation: Updates must not interfere with runtime operations, allow modification of unrelated components, or expose sensitive data.

flowchart LR
    A[Host System or Update Agent]
    B[Receives Update Payload]
    C[Verifies Signature]
    D[Checks Version Policy]
    E[Applies Update]
    F[Reboots to New Firmware]

    A --> B --> C --> D --> E --> F

Figure: Generic Secure Update Flow

Update delivery may be initiated by the OS or host firmware. The platform verifies signatures and version constraints before committing the update and restarting the system.

Secure EC Services

flowchart TD
    subgraph Host System
        A1[ACPI Methods]
        A2[ACPI Notification Events]
    end

    subgraph Secure World
        B1["Hafnium (FFA Handler)"]
    end

    subgraph EC
        C1[EC Dispatcher]
        C2[Subsystem Controller]
    end

    A1 -->|"Secure Path (ARM/FFA)"| B1
    A2 -->|Notifications| B1
    B1 -->|Structured Command| C1
    C1 --> C2

    A1 -->|"Non-Secure (x86)"| C1

Figure: Host–EC Communication Paths

The host communicates with the EC via ACPI calls and notification events. On ARM platforms with secure world enforcement, messages are routed through Hafnium via FF-A interfaces. On x86 platforms, communication is direct. The EC dispatcher then forwards commands to appropriate subsystem controllers.